Either way, the elimination of anarchy implies singularity—or sovereignty. One single authority or one single power must be setting the rules of the game in a realm. If more than one ruler think of the Pope and the Emperor in the Middle Ages claims supremacy, the subjects would no longer know whom to obey: The problem of uncertain knowledge the plight of anarchy would reappear. Hobbes did not prioritize either law or power as a solution to the problem of uncertainty in his early works.
But law has precedence in his mature treatise, Leviathan , where the new doctrine of authorization is introduced chap.
Law, when authorized from below, produces legal authority. This is a stable uncertainty mitigating solution to uncertainty since the act of authorization presupposes an obligation commitment to keep laws one has authorized oneself.
Conversely, superior power remains an inherently unstable solution because the dominated would not cease hoping to reverse this superiority, one day. Anarchy in the first generic sense a lack of supreme juridical authority for Hobbes serves to explain why there is anarchy in the second generic sense chaos.
Realists have reworked and enriched the puzzle of international anarchy inherited from Hobbes. Other classical figures of political thought, Thucydides and Machiavelli, have been a profound inspiration for the classical realists political realists Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, E.
A distinct, scientific paradigm of realism— neorealism or structural realism —was inaugurated by Kenneth Waltz in his influential Theory of International Politics The neorealist paradigm has its variations. While it is notoriously difficult to specify what unifies realism as a school of thought Guzzini, , pp. By adding different auxiliary premises to this core, classical realists and neorealists reach different conclusions about the character of international politics and about the role of international anarchy.
Beitz, [] , pp. This leaves open the further question of whether a domestic anarchy among human beings is analogous to an international anarchy among states. While realists reject the first argument about society , they embrace the second about anarchy.
They think that the idea of a society of states is a contradiction, and that states behave like individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature. On this basis, they assert an asymmetry between the domestic and the international sphere premise 3. Classical realists express this asymmetry in normative language. Domestic political theory, as Martin Wight , p. Typically, classical realists appeal to international anarchy understood as disorder chaos and violence rather than as the absence of a common superior.
Given the premise of international disorder, key explanatory factors of state conduct are the ethical priority of the domestic over the international realm, or human nature.
The category of power tends to overshadow anarchy. Hegemony implies that one agency dominates others through influence, and empire refers to an institutionalized structure of rule where a metropolitan center exercises imperial control over subordinate units in the periphery. Adam Watson , pp. These considerations show that the anarchy-hierarchy distinction, even though acknowledged, is not theoretically basic in classical realism.
In sharp contrast, neorealist theory treats hierarchy and anarchy as basic, mutually exclusive categories. The pioneer of neorealism, Waltz, employs anarchy as a demarcation criterion to differentiate the domain of international politics from domestic politics. Domestic politics consists of relations of political rule that are arranged hierarchically vertically under domestic government; international politics is ordered anarchically horizontally in the absence of world government Waltz, , p.
Waltz uses the term anarchy in a second sense, to denote a basic structural property of the international system Waltz, , p. Theory of foreign policy, exemplified by classical realism, views each state as an atom: The actions of other states may inadvertently obstruct its action but they do not systematically constrain it. Guzzini, , pp.
Analytically, any system consists of interacting units and structure Waltz, , pp. The structure has three tiers: an ordering principle unit arrangement , the functional differentiation of the units, and distribution of capabilities Waltz, , pp. Waltz relies on two parallel concepts of anarchy that he does not always distinguish consistently. First, anarchy, as a demarcation criterion, refers to the absence of world government. Second, anarchy, as a horizontal order of nominally equal units is the ordering principle of the international system.
It comprises the first layer of Waltzian structure. Its second layer is supposed to capture the functional differentiation of the units. Because of this, the second tier of structure is a fixed parameter with respect to state interaction. All three tiers represent structural properties of the international system as a whole and cannot be reduced to the unit-level properties of its constituent units, states.
In an anarchical international system, states differ in capabilities but perform an identical task—security provision. Hence their basic motive is to secure their own survival and, if possible, to accumulate power Waltz, , pp. Consequently, the international system has polarity: the system-wide distribution of capabilities power across all the units Waltz, , p.
The outcome of their collision is a system of balance of power distribution of capabilities that emerges unintentionally. Waltz elucidates it by means of a laissez-faire analogy Waltz, , pp. Once formed, a system-level balance of power exerts structural constraints on subsequent state action and tends to restore systemic equilibrium. Apart from the international system, he claims, its individual units, states, have deep structure.
Such a state does not face internal threats to its national security and its external relations with other states are more stable. A critical mass of strong states promotes the emergence of mature anarchy in international relations Buzan, [] , p. The neorealist view of international anarchy has been criticized for its neglect of change and historicity by constructivists and poststructuralists.
If functional differentiation is reintroduced as a variable, it would reveal a systemic change—from functionally heteronomous units in the medieval system to homogeneous sovereign units in the modern one Ruggie, , pp.
Constructivists have pointed out that neorealists are too swift to associate international anarchy with mutual hostility, security dilemmas and worst case scenarios.
In Social Theory of International Politics , Wendt challenges the neorealist view of anarchy as an immutable, deep structure. Instead, anarchy is constituted by culture macro-level normative structure , which may be a Hobbesian culture of enmity, a Lockean culture of rivalry, or a Kantian culture of friendship Wendt, , pp. To say that states form their own society, an international society , is to assume that they are like socially competent human beings who follow common rules and norms together.
Nonetheless, unlike domestic society, international society is organized anarchically because its member states maintain sovereign equality in their external relations. The puzzle of the domestic analogy is focal here—to what extent does international society resemble domestic society? The contemporary international society approach has two distinct strands. The second strand of international society theory is a branch of international political theory dedicated to questions of international morality.
The difference between these two strands can be measured as an analytical distance from classical realism Brown, Bull and Wight maintain an ambivalent but close connection to classical realism, Walzer grants that realist premises may be a limiting case of international morality, and Nardin dissociates international morality from realism, treating them as ideal types. They reserve the label structural realism for their historicized analysis of international systems.
After this capacity reaches a threshold an international system evolves into an international society Buzan et al. Interpretation matters since the rules of international society are assumed to have meanings. It is a theory of international order where order is defined in sociological terms Bull, [] , p.
Having distinguished government from rules external constraints on conduct as order-maintaining devices, Bull argues that states inside international society recognize common rules without recognizing a common government Bull, [] , pp. This complex of rules—rules of balance of power, rules of war, rules of great powers, rules of international law, and rules of diplomacy Bull, [] , pp.
International society does not include all nominally existing states around The primary institutions of international society impose normative limits on what is permissible to do for any state that claims to be a member in good standing.
One important issue concerns the primary institution of international law. What sets the global law of a global state a hierarchical order apart from the international law of international society an anarchical order is that inside the latter, member states make the law together, as formal equals.
The compatibility of international society and international anarchy implicates the domestic analogy: It invites us to examine the degree of similarity between a society composed of states and domestic society.
Despite disagreements in other respects, various international society theorists all endorse a qualified domestic analogy. They agree that states, like competent social beings, act under the constraint of common institutions but insist and this is the qualification that the primary institutions of international society are sui generis.
International society is a normative structure in its own right—it is not just an epiphenomenon of domestic society. The first and cardinal one is that unlike human beings, states are very hard to kill. Second, states are not compelled to invest the bulk of their resources into the pursuit of security the way Hobbesian individuals in the domestic state of nature are: so a state can invest considerable resources into internal economic development and international trade. Third, a state especially a great power is highly self-sufficient economically and its self-sufficiency is not easily destroyed during interstate war.
Unlike domestic anarchy, therefore, international anarchy is a palatable condition that allows for international cooperation among states. One way to ground this morality is to appeal to the fundamental right of self-preservation, as Grotius [] did in The Rights of War and Peace Tuck, []. Given that in the international state of nature all states have an identical aim, self-preservation, and if no state should be blamed for pursuing this aim, then the best course of action for all states collectively is to grant each other a reciprocal right to exist Tuck, , pp.
A moral non-prudential ground for the morality of states is offered by Walzer. Walzer [] depicts each state as a legal shell that protects the rights of individuals members of a self-determining political community. The result is a basic principle of peaceful coexistence among states, which implies the recognition of specific state rights to territorial integrity and nonintervention.
The international sphere, on this view, is not a jungle but a civilized society of states. Only in extremis , a political community threatened with annihilation might resort to preemptive strikes, the usual arsenal of realism Walzer, [] , pp. The morality of states, then, is a morality of peaceful coexistence. It presupposes an anarchical society because anarchy respects the fact of international plurality where various political communities, each with its distinctive conception of the good, coexist.
It is a minimalist morality: It imposes an obligation on states not to injure one another but it does not require them to practice mutual aid. In the international society literature, this position goes under the label of pluralism. Pluralists hold that a group of agents accept common rules or norms as procedural limits on conduct without accepting common substantive purposes such as moral perfection or economic redistribution.
This brings up the question about the values and norms that underwrite the anarchical society of states. One value implicit in the discussion so far is the freedom of the individual be it a state or a human person. From a neo-Hegelian perspective, Mervyn Frost has developed constitutive theory Frost, that links the value of freedom to two anarchical practices Frost, : the society of sovereign states and global civil society a global rights practice.
Both are anarchical in form, and exclude the hierarchical social forms found in slave-owning societies and in empires. According to Frost, the most distinctive feature of our present historical epoch is that nearly everyone, everywhere simultaneously participates in both anarchical practices. In modernity, freedom is realized as rights holding. What the notion of anarchy contributes to this Hegelian framework is that a horizontal anarchical social form assures its participants of their equal standing as free agents.
Thus, in the global rights practice, participant individuals constitute one another as holders of equal sets of basic rights freedoms and in the global practice of states, participant states constitute one another as holders of equal sets of sovereign freedoms Frost, , pp.
But freedom has its dark side. For example, men and women who exercise their freedom of contract as economic agents in global civil society are in permanent competition with one another, generating huge power differentials globally. Following Hobbes, Kant holds that unless we build a centralized legal order, a state, a condition of lawlessness and disorder anarchy in the second sense would prevail.
This is the reason Kant embraced the idea of world government initially. Such an alignment of Kant and Hobbes might seem awkward at first blush. It may be recalled that Hobbes defined the state as a centralized juridical institution for making, interpreting, and enforcing the law.
While Kant operates within this Hobbesian tradition, he has a special task in mind: to spell out the features of a properly constituted state: a republic. In the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace , Kant urges that the constitution of each state must be republican. This invocation of the domestic make-up of the state has promoted the view of Kant as a liberal. Here liberalism refers to a doctrine in contemporary political science that construes of the international sphere as an extension of domestic law and politics.
Second, Kant wants to preclude the possibility that a well-organized society domestically might resort to war internationally without proper ground e. Williams, Kant is making two claims about the normative structure of the international realm. The challenge is to understand what Kant means by free states, and how he connects freedom to anarchy.
In The Doctrine of Right , Kant argues that in the domestic state of nature individuals hold an innate right to freedom Kant, [] , VI The hazard of interference arises because they are physical entities confined to a finite space Flikschuh, ; Ripstein, , p. This principle must have teeth: It must be coercively enforceable.
The state as a public realm of law, where law regulates the external freedom of agents by coercive means, creates the principle of right. However, public coercion must be rightful.
It must be universal in that it makes everybody, not just some, secure in their relations, including their normative relations or rights; and it must ensure non-domination by preventing the will of one person from arbitrarily determining the choice of another person Ripstein, , pp.
Hobbes and Kant both define the state as a public realm of law: a res publica. Conversely, in a despotism, the state is a private property of the despot. A republic comprises a public system of rules laws created by authorized officials. It distributes and determines the juridical rights of the citizens; it enforces these rights coercively as a matter of right ; and it treats citizens as equal under the law.
But formal equality is not enough. In a properly constituted Kantian state—a republic or Rechtsstaat a rule-of-law state —the citizens ought to be equally free. This requires the law-making prerogative of the legislators to be limited by a civil constitution. Such limits ensure that the law is just: that it is universal and non-arbitrary or that it applies to everybody, including the legislators themselves. In this light, Perpetual Peace can be read as a proposal for establishing an international rule of law.
It envisages an international public authority a league of states to uphold an ideal international constitution whose aim is to permanently outlaw war.
Perpetual Peace lays down the articles of this international constitution. The definitive articles demand a republican constitution for each state domestically , a league of free states internationally , and a cosmopolitan principle of universal hospitality globally. Once ratified, these articles become binding on member states, but entry into the pacific league is voluntary or non-coercive Cavallar, , p.
The impermissibility of coercing any state into membership makes the foedus pacificum an anarchical freedom-respecting international society. The Athenian envoys presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or surrender, and from the outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to think only about their survival.
Since such an authority above states does not exist, the Athenians argue that in this lawless condition of international anarchy, the only right is the right of the stronger to dominate the weaker.
They explicitly equate right with might, and exclude considerations of justice from foreign affairs. We can thus find strong support for a realist perspective in the statements of the Athenians. Political realism is usually contrasted by IR scholars with idealism or liberalism, a theoretical perspective that emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states, and international cooperation.
For the Melians, who employ idealistic arguments, the choice is between war and subjection 5. They are courageous and love their country. They do not wish to lose their freedom, and in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are prepared to defend themselves 5. They base their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they associate with fairness, and regard the Athenians as unjust 5.
They are pious, believing that gods will support their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and trust in alliances, thinking that their allies, the Spartans, who are also related to them, will help them 5.
Hence, one can identify in the speech of the Melians elements of the idealistic or liberal world view: the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, that they have mutual obligations to one another and will carry out such obligations, and that a war of aggression is unjust.
What the Melians nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In their decision to defend themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand or by prudent calculations. The Athenian argument is based on key realist concepts such as security and power, and is informed not by what the world should be, but by what it is. The Athenians disregard any moral talk and urge the Melians to look at the facts—that is, to recognize their military inferiority, to consider the potential consequences of their decision, and to think about their own survival 5.
There appears to be a powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their position, based on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on rationality, intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination, their logic proves to be seriously flawed. Melos, a relatively weak state, does not pose any real security threat to them. The eventual destruction of Melos does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which Athens will lose a few years later.
In the History , Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power. There are no logical limits to the size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and gain, after conquering Melos, the Athenians engage in a war against Sicily. They pay no attention to the Melian argument that considerations of justice are useful to all in the longer run 5. And, as the Athenians overestimate their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves to be very shortsighted indeed.
It is utopian to ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely on power alone. Thucydides appears to support neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the cynicism of their Athenian opponents. Idealism in international relations, like realism, can lay claim to a long tradition. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political idealists who believed that there were some universal moral values on which political life could be based.
Building on the work of his predecessors, Cicero developed the idea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both domestic and international politics. His ideas concerning righteousness in war were carried further in the writings of the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. Machiavelli — challenged this well-established moral tradition, thus positioning himself as a political innovator.
The novelty of his approach lies in his critique of classical Western political thought as unrealistic, and in his separation of politics from ethics.
He thereby lays the foundations for modern politics. It represents the sum of the practical conditions that he believes are required to make both the individual and the country prosperous and strong. Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism that is applied to both domestic and international affairs. It is a doctrine which denies the relevance of morality in politics, and claims that all means moral and immoral are justified to achieve certain political ends.
Machiavelli justified immoral actions in politics, but never refused to admit that they are evil. He operated within the single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific task of his nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of a double ethics: one public and one private, to push Machiavellian realism to even further extremes, and to apply it to international relations.
Thus he overturned the traditional morality. Referring to Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the state was power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers, and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster this power.
He considered international agreements to be binding only insofar as it was expedient for the state. The idea of an autonomous ethics of state behavior and the concept of realpolitik were thus introduced. These concepts, along with the belief in the superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons with which German statesmen, from the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, justified their policies of conquest and extermination.
Machiavelli is often praised for his prudential advice to leaders which has caused him to be regarded as a founding master of modern political strategy and for his defense of the republican form of government. There are certainly many aspects of his thought that merit such praise.
Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as the thinker who bears foremost responsibility for the demoralization of Europe. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the mainstream of Western political thought.
It was the force and timeliness of his justification of resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving political ends that persuaded so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who followed him. The effects of Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the employment of all possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the battlefields of modern Europe, as mass citizen armies fought against each other to the bitter end without regard for the rules of justice.
The tension between expediency and morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of a double ethics, private and public, that created a further damage to traditional, customary ethics was invented. Perhaps the greatest problem with realism in international relations is that it has a tendency to slip into its extreme version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the state at the expense of other states, no matter how morally problematic the policy is.
Thomas Hobbes — was part of an intellectual movement whose goal was to free the emerging modern science from the constraints of the classical and scholastic heritage. According to classical political philosophy, on which the idealist perspective is based, human beings can control their desires through reason and can work for the benefit of others, even at the expense of their own benefit.
They are thus both rational and moral agents, capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and of making moral choices. They are also naturally social. With great skill Hobbes attacks these views. They therefore inevitably struggle for power. In setting out such ideas, Hobbes contributes to some of the basic conceptions fundamental to the realist tradition in international relations, and especially to neorealism.
These include the characterization of human nature as egoistic, the concept of international anarchy, and the view that politics, rooted in the struggle for power, can be rationalized and studied scientifically.
He derives his notion of the state of war from his views of both human nature and the condition in which individuals exist. Anyone may at any time use force, and all must constantly be ready to counter such force with force.
Being suspicious of one another and driven by fear, they are also likely to engage in preemptive actions and invade one another to ensure their own safety.
Finally, individuals are also driven by pride and a desire for glory. Hobbes is primarily concerned with the relationship between individuals and the state, and his comments about relations among states are scarce.
Nevertheless, what he says about the lives of individuals in the state of nature can also be interpreted as a description of how states exist in relation to one another. Accordingly, the quest and struggle for power lies at the core of the Hobbesian vision of relations among states.
The same would later be true of the model of international relations developed by Hans Morgenthau, who was deeply influenced by Hobbes and adopted the same view of human nature. By subjecting themselves to a sovereign, individuals escape the war of all against all which Hobbes associates with the state of nature; however, this war continues to dominate relations among states.
This does not mean that states are always fighting, but rather that they have a disposition to fight XIII 8. With each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time. The achievement of domestic security through the creation of a state is then paralleled by a condition of inter-state insecurity. One can argue that if Hobbes were fully consistent, he would agree with the notion that, to escape this condition, states should also enter into a contract and submit themselves to a world sovereign.
He does not propose that a social contract among nations be implemented to bring international anarchy to an end. This is because the condition of insecurity in which states are placed does not necessarily lead to insecurity for their citizens. As long as an armed conflict or other type of hostility between states does not actually break out, individuals within a state can feel relatively secure.
His theory of international relations, which assumes that independent states, like independent individuals, are enemies by nature, asocial and selfish, and that there is no moral limitation on their behavior, is a great challenge to the idealist political vision based on human sociability and to the concept of the international jurisprudence that is built on this vision. However, what separates Hobbes from Machiavelli and associates him more with classical realism is his insistence on the defensive character of foreign policy.
His political theory does not put forward the invitation to do whatever may be advantageous for the state. His approach to international relations is prudential and pacific: sovereign states, like individuals, should be disposed towards peace which is commended by reason. By suggesting that certain dictates of reason apply even in the state of nature, he affirms that more peaceful and cooperative international relations are possible.
Neither does he deny the existence of international law. Sovereign states can sign treaties with one another to provide a legal basis for their relations. At the same time, however, Hobbes seems aware that international rules will often prove ineffective in restraining the struggle for power. States will interpret them to their own advantage, and so international law will be obeyed or ignored according to the interests of the states affected. Hence, international relations will always tend to be a precarious affair.
Twentieth-century realism was born in response to the idealist perspective that dominated international relations scholarship in the aftermath of the First World War. The idealists of the s and s also called liberal internationalists or utopians had the goal of building peace in order to prevent another world conflict. They saw the solution to inter-state problems as being the creation of a respected system of international law, backed by international organizations.
This interwar idealism resulted in the founding of the League of Nations in and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of outlawing war and providing for the peaceful settlements of disputes. Fosdick, and other prominent idealists of the era, gave their intellectual support to the League of Nations. Instead of focusing on what some might see as the inevitability of conflict between states and peoples, they chose to emphasize the common interests that could unite humanity, and attempted to appeal to rationality and morality.
For them, war did not originate in an egoistic human nature, but rather in imperfect social conditions and political arrangements, which could be improved.
Yet their ideas were already being criticized in the early s by Reinhold Niebuhr and within a few years by E. This fact, perhaps more than any theoretical argument, produced a strong realist reaction. Then, during the s and s, classical realism came under challenge of scholars who tried to introduce a more scientific approach to the study of international politics.
During the s it gave way to another trend in international relations theory—neorealism. Since it is impossible within the scope of this article to introduce all of the thinkers who contributed to the development of twentieth-century classical realism, E.
Despite these criticisms, realism remains central within the field of IR theory, with most other theories concerned at least in part with critiquing it. For that reason, it would be inappropriate to write a textbook on IR theory without covering realism in the first chapter.
In addition, realism continues to offer many important insights about the world of policymaking due to its history of offering tools of statecraft to policymakers. In June , the group published a document where it claimed to have traced the lineage of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, back to the prophet Muhammad. As caliph, al-Baghdadi demanded the allegiance of devout Muslims worldwide and the group and its supporters set about conducting a range of extreme and barbaric acts.
Many of these were targeted at cities in Western nations such as Melbourne, Manchester and Paris — which has led to the issue becoming a global one.
Ultimately, the intent is to create an Islamic State or Caliphate in geopolitical, cultural and political terms and to deter via the use of terrorism and extreme actions Western or regional powers from interfering with this process. Despite it not being an officially recognised state, by taking and holding territory in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State group clearly possessed aspects of statehood. The major part of efforts to fight the Islamic State group has comprised airstrikes against its positions, combined with other military strategies such as using allied local forces to retake territory most notably in Iraq.
This suggests that war is considered the most effective method of counterbalancing the increasing power of terrorism in the Middle East and neutralising the threat that the Islamic State group poses not only to Western states but also to states in the region. So, while transnational terrorism, such as that practised by the Islamic State group, is a relatively new threat in international relations, states have relied on old strategies consistent with realism to deal with it. States ultimately count on self-help for guaranteeing their own security.
Within this context, realists have two main strategies for managing insecurity: the balance of power and deterrence. The balance of power relies on strategic, flexible alliances, while deterrence relies on the threat or the use of significant force. Both are in evidence in this case. First, the loose coalition of states that attacked the Islamic State group — states such as the US, Russia and France — relied on various fair-weather alliances with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran.
At the same time, they downplayed the role of international organisations because agreeing action in places such as the United Nations is difficult due to state rivalry.
However, the rational actor approach presupposes that the enemy — even if a terrorist group — is also a rational actor who would choose a course of action in which the benefits outweigh the risks. Via this point, we can see that while the actions of a terrorist group might appear irrational, they can be interpreted otherwise.
From a realist perspective, the Islamic State group, by spreading terror, is using the limited means at its disposal to counterbalance Western influence in Iraq and Syria.
First, it would contribute to fuelling anti-Western sentiment throughout the Middle East as local populations become the target of foreign aggression.
It is for reasons such as those unpacked in this case, in regions that are as complex as the Middle East, that realists recommend extreme caution regarding when and where a state uses its military power. It is easy when viewing realism to see it as a warmongering theory.
For example, on reading the first half of the paragraph above you might feel that realism would support an attack on the Islamic State group. But when you read the second half of the paragraph you will find that the same theory recommends extreme caution. Hopf, T. Lebow, R. Mearsheimer, J.
Smith, S. Waltz, K. Weber, C. Routledge, London. Wendt, A. Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing.
E-IR is an independent non-profit publisher run by an all volunteer team. Your donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our bandwidth bills to ensure we keep our existing titles free to view. Any amount, in any currency, is appreciated. Many thanks! Donations are voluntary and not required to download the e-book - your link to download is below.
This content was originally written for an undergraduate or Master's program. It is published as part of our mission to showcase peer-leading papers written by students during their studies. Bibliography Adem, S. Pearson Longman, London Grieco, J.
Routledge, London Wendt, A. Please Consider Donating Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing. Download PDF.
Subscribe Get our weekly email.
0コメント